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Equilibrium Solution in a Game between a Cooperative
and its Members
Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Antonino Scarelli†,
Zolt´ an Varga‡
Abstract In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conﬂict situation in
which the members of a marketing cooperative may take advantage of an external market price,
higher than that offered by the cooperative. Under appropriate conditions on the penalty stra-
tegy of the cooperative, the faithfulness of all members will provide a Nash equilibrium for the
considered game, which at the same time also is an attractive solution, with the cooperative as a
distinguished player.
Keywords Cooperatives, Game Theory, Nash equilibria
JEL classiﬁcation C02, C70, Q13   † ‡
1. Introduction
An agricultural cooperative in a given region may perform several activities, ranging
from product processing to complex marketing, see e.g. Cobia (1989). Producers of
a given product often form a marketing cooperative, only for the commercialization
of their product. A typical situation is when a marketing cooperative negotiates a
contracted price with large buyers, sharing risk among members of the cooperative.
However, by the time of the actual commercialization of the product, the direct market
price may be higher than that the cooperative can guarantee for members, negotiated
on beforehand. Some “unfaithful” members may be interested in selling at least a part
of their product outside the cooperative. The latter however, can punish them for it.
This conﬂict situation is described in terms of a game-theoretical model.
This one-step conﬂict situation was studied in Larbani and Scarelli (2004). A dy-
namic evolutionary game approach was applied in Varga et al. (2010), also dealing
with the case of oligopoly market conditions.
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In the present paper we consider an agricultural cooperative where producers, as
part of their strategy in dealing with the cooperative, at the beginning of the yearly pro-
duction cycle declare a projected quantity to be sold to the cooperative at a contracted
price. At the time of the harvest, as a second strategy choice, each producer decides
how much of his production he would actually sell to the cooperative. If a producer
does not deliver the contracted amount, he will be punished by the cooperative, pro-
portionally to the undelivered amount and to the extra proﬁt gained from selling on the
direct market. It is up to the cooperative to set the penalty rates. If by the time of the
harvest, the direct market price turns out to be lower than the contracted price guar-
anteed by the cooperative, the latter would not buy more than the contracted amount.
We will ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium solution for this conﬂict situation, supposing that the
higher direct market price will occur with a given probability.
2. Model description
Let us suppose that there are n members in a marketing cooperative, and the general
potential production capacity of the j-th member is expressed by a reference value qj,
inpracticethiscanbetheamountsoldbythememberathisentrancetothecooperative,
or a weighted mean of yearly productions, discounting the early years with respect to
the recent ones. Hence the total production potential of the cooperative is å
n
j=1qj.
Considering a given year, for simplicity we suppose that qj is a good estimation of
the production of the year, and both the contracted (promised) amount and the amount
actually sold to the cooperative will be expressed as a multiple of this reference value.
Assume that at the beginning of the vegetation (or production) period, the coop-
erative, based on its production potential, can negotiate with a large buyer, agreeing
on a unit price Qc at which the cooperative can contract the amount offered by each
member. Suppose that the j-th member decides to contract the amount kjqj, this is his
ﬁrst strategic decision. By the time of harvesting, the unit price Qd of the direct market
may be higher or lower than the contracted unit price Qc the cooperative offered at the
beginning. We will consider two different situations and the combination of them.
Case 1. We suppose that the decision of the members on how much product to deliver
to the cooperative, is made when the direct market price is already known to be higher
than the contracted price: Qd > Qc. Then the j-th member may decide to sell only
a part of his production, hjqj, to the cooperative (0  hj  kj). The cooperative,
however, proportionally penalizes the unfaithful member in two ways, both for failed
delivery and for the extra proﬁt due to unfaithfulness, with respective penalty rates p0
and p1. The pair (p0;p1) will be then considered the strategy choice of the cooperative.
In this situation, the j-th member takes his second strategic decision, by the choice of
hj. This conﬂict situation can be modelled in terms of a many-player game.
For j 2 f1;:::;ng, let the j-th player be the j-th member of the cooperative, and
denote by k0
j 2 [0;1] the minimal reasonable declaration acceptable to the cooperative
from member j, considered the j-th player. Then, in terms of the above notations, the
strategy set of the latter, is deﬁned as
Aj := f(kj;hj) 2 [k0
j;1][0;1]jhj  kjg: (1)
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With some P0  1, let p0 2 [0;P0] be the penalty rate, the cooperative sets for non-




let p1 2 [0;P1] be the penalty rate, the cooperative sets for the extra proﬁt a member
gained from selling the non-delivered amount on the direct market. Set
An+1 := [0;P0][0;P1] (2)
is considered as the strategy set of the cooperative as (n+1)-th player. Given a multi-
strategy ((k1;h1);:::;(kn;hn);(p0;p1)) 2 n+1
j=1Aj, the payoff of the j-th player is de-
ﬁned as the total gain from the cooperative and the direct market, minus the penalty
paid for unfaithfulness, i.e. for having failed to deliver the contracted amount and for
having sold it on the direct market:
Fj((k1;h1);:::;(kn;hn);(p0;p1)) := Qd(1 hj)qj +Qchjqj   p0Qc(kj  hj)qj
 p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)qj; j 2 f1;:::;ng (3)
while the payoff of the cooperative is the gain from selling the contracted and actually
delivered product, minus the damage caused by non-delivery, plus the penalty collected




















Case 2. Assume that the direct market price is less than or equal to the contracted price,
ˆ Qd  Qc, and the cooperative accepts only the contracted amount of the production of
each member. Now it is reasonable for the members to sell the promised amount to
the cooperative, and the rest on the direct market, which means hj = kj. Hence, for the
respective payoff functions, for each multi-strategy ((k1;h1);:::;(kn;hn);(p0;p1)) 2
n+1
j=1Aj, we have
ˆ Fj((k1;h1);:::;(kn;hn);(p0;p1)) = ˆ Qd(1 hj)qj +Qchjqj; j 2 f1;:::;ng (5)







for the cooperative. In this case, there is no real conﬂict situation.
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Case 3. Suppose ﬁnally that at the time of the strategy choice, the players judge that,
by the time of the commercialization Qd >Qc will take place with probability r2[0;1],
and ˆ Qd  Qc with probability 1 r. Then, for the corresponding game the expected
payoffs are
Fj := rFj +(1 r) ˆ Fj; j 2 f1;:::;ng; (7)
Fn+1 := rFn+1+(1 r) ˆ Fn+1: (8)
3. Equilibrium solutions of the games
In this section, under the condition of a sufﬁciently high penalty rate for unfaithfulness,
we prove the existence of equilibrium solutions (Nash equilibria) for Cases 2 and 3. An
equilibrium solution means a multi-strategy in which all players are interested in the
following sense: No player can be better off by deviating from his equilibrium strategy,
provided the rest of the players stick to their equilibrium strategy.
Theorem1. ConsideringCase1(Qd >Qc), letussupposethecooperativesetspenalty
rates p
0 2 [0;P0], p







1)) is a Nash equilibrium for the game with
strategy sets (1)–(2) and payoffs (3)–(4).
Proof. Fix a j 2 f1;:::;ng, and let (kj;hj) 2 Aj with (kj;hj) 6= (1;1). Then condition
(9) obviously implies
Qd(1 hj)qj  p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)qj  p0Qc(kj  hj)q+ p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)qj:
Hence we obtain
Qd(1 hj)qj   p0Qc(kj  hj)q  p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)qj  0;
implying the Nash inequality for the j-th player:
Fj((1;1);:::;(kj;hj);:::;(1;1);(p
0;p





 Qcqj = Fj((1;1);:::;(1;1);(p
0;p
1)):









For the more general Case 3, when Qd > Qc will take place with probability
r 2 [0;1] known to the players at the time of their strategy choice, we also have the
existence of similar Nash equilibria:
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Remark 1. Condition (9), written in the form p
1(Qd  Qc)  Qd, can be interpreted
as follows: for the equilibrium solution the penalty rate for proﬁt per unit of goods,
obtained from selling on the direct market, must be higher than (or equal to) the unit
price on the direct market.
Theorem 2. Considering Case 3, let us suppose the cooperative chooses strategy
( ¯ p0; ¯ p1) 2 An+1 with expected penalty rate for the extra proﬁt of an unfaithful mem-
ber, high enough:
r ¯ p1 
Qd
Qd  Qc: (10)
Then multi-strategy ((1;1);:::;(1;1);( ¯ p0; ¯ p1)) is a Nash equilibrium for the game (1),
(2), (7), (8).
Proof. Fix a j 2 f1;:::;ng, and let (kj;hj) 2 Aj with(kj;hj) 6= (1;1). Now inequality
(10) implies
Qd  r ¯ p1(Qd  Qc);
and therefore we have
rQd(1 hj)qj  rQd(1 hj)qj
 r ¯ p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)q
 r[ ¯ p0Qc(kj  hj)q+ ¯ p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)qj]:
Hence, using inequality ˆ Qd  Qc, we get
Fj((1;1);:::;(kj;hj);:::;(1;1);( ¯ p0; ¯ p1))=(1 r)( ˆ Qd(1 hj)qj+Qchjqj)+rQchjqj
+r[Qd(1 hj)qj   ¯ p0Qc(kj  hj)q  ¯ p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)qj]
= (1 r) ˆ Qd(1 hj)qj +Qchjqj +
+r[Qd(1 hj)qj   ¯ p0Qc(kj  hj)q  ¯ p1(Qd  Qc)(1 hj)qj]
 Qc(1 hj)qj + Qchjqj = Qcqj = Fj((1;1);:::;(1;1);:::;(1;1);( ¯ p0; ¯ p1)):














= Fn+1((1;1);:::;(1;1);( ¯ p0; ¯ p1)):

Remark 2. Similarly to Case 1, the interpretation of condition (8), r ¯ p1(Qd  Qc) 
Qd; can be interpreted as follows: For the equilibrium solution the expected penalty
rate for the proﬁt per unit of good, obtained from selling on the direct market, must be
higher than (or equal to) the unit price on the direct market.
Remark 3. Note that, if Qd > Qc would hold with probability r = 1, from Theorem 2,
as a particular case Theorem 1 is obtained.
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Remark 4. Case 3 also includes a more general stochastic approach in the following
sense: Given a distribution of the market price, parameter r of Case 3 (i.e. the proba-
bility of Qd > Qc) can be calculated and the expected payoffs can be obtained using
formulae (7)–(8).
Remark 5. It is easy to see that the Nash equilibria of Theorems 1 and 2 are also
attractive solutions of the respective games, in the sense of the following deﬁnition,
(see e.g. Larbani 1997 and Varga et al. 2010). Consider an N-player game where





Xi the set of multi-strategies,
Fi : X ! R the payoff of the i-th player, F := (F1;:::;FN).
Deﬁnition 1. A multi-strategy x0 is said to be an attractive solution of the normal form
game (X,F), if there exists distinguished player i 2 f1;:::;Ng such that the following
conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) Fj(x1;:::;x0





N)  Fi(x0), xi 2 Xi.
Remark 6. If in condition (i), for each j 2 f1;:::;ngnfig we choose xk := x0
k 2 Xk for
k 2 f1;:::;Ngnfi; jg, and an arbitrary xj 2 Xj, we obtain that any attractive solution
is a Nash equilibrium, too.
The interpretation of the distinguished player is the following: if player i sticks to
his equilibrium strategy, the rest of the players can not increase their payoff even if
they deviate together from their equilibrium strategies. In the context of our game, the
distinguished player is the cooperative.
4. Example: Marketing cooperative for the commercialization of apples
For an illustration suppose that there are six members in a marketing cooperative com-
mercializing the apples they produce. Under the general conditions of the model de-
scription of Section 2, assume their respective production potentials qj (in quintals)




Let Qc =30 and Qd =36 be the unit price (in euros) paid by the cooperative and the
direct market, respectively. Then the threshold (8) for the penalty rate the cooperative
sets for the extra proﬁt a member would gain from selling the non-delivered amount
on the direct market, is Qd=(Qd  Qc) = 6. Now suppose the cooperative threatens the
members with penalty rates p
0 = 0:1 and p
1 = 6:1. Theorem 1 then says that in case
of total faithfulness, i.e. when each member sells all his product to the cooperative, we
obtain a Nash equilibrium ((1;1);:::;(1;1);(p
0;p
1)). Table 1 shows the equilibrium
values of the respective payoffs Fj and Fn+1. In particular, the sum of the payoffs of
the members equals the payoff 19,980 of the cooperative.
Now we suppose member 4 deviates from its equilibrium strategy, choosing stra-
tegy pair (0.9, 0.8), but all other players stick to their equilibrium strategy, with p
0 =
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Table 1. With penalty rates p
0 = 0:1 and p
1 = 6:1, at Nash equilibrium, the sum of the payoffs
of the members equals the payoff 19,980 of the cooperative.
Member qj kj kjqj hj hjqj (1 hj)qj (kj  hj)qj Direct Coop NonDel Extra Fj Fn+1
1 60 1 60 1 60 0 0 0 1,800 0 0 1,800 19,980
2 90 1 90 1 90 0 0 0 2,700 0 0 2,700 2,700
3 60 1 60 1 60 0 0 0 1,800 0 0 1,800 1,800
4 100 1 100 1 100 0 0 0 3,000 0 0 3,000 3,000
5 180 1 180 1 180 0 0 0 5,400 0 0 5,400 5,400
6 176 1 176 1 176 0 0 0 5,280 0 0 5,280 5,280
Totals 666 666 666 0 0 0 19,980 0 0 19,980 19,980
0:1 and p
1 = 6:1 for the cooperative. Table 2 shows that the payoff 2,358 of member
4 is less than its equilibrium value 3,000. The payoff of the cooperative also decreases
from its equilibrium value 19,980 to 19,842. Of course, by setting a penalty rate p
1
higher than 6.1, the cooperative may try to compensate its loss.
Table 2. For member 4, the strategy choice kj = 0:9 and qj = 0:8, results in loss in payoff with
respect to its equilibrium value.
Member qj kj kjqj hj hjqj (1 hj)qj (kj  hj)qj Direct Coop NonDelExtra Fj Fn+1
1 60 1 60 1 60 0 0 0 1,800 0 0 1,800 1,800
2 90 1 90 1 90 0 0 0 2,700 0 0 2,700 2,700
3 60 1 60 1 60 0 0 0 1,800 0 0 1,800 1,800
4 1000.9 90 0.8 80 20 10 720 2,400 30 732 2,358 2,862
5 180 1 180 1 180 0 0 0 5,400 0 0 5,400 5,400
6 176 1 176 1 176 0 0 0 5,280 0 0 5,280 5,280
Totals 666 656 646 20 10 720 19,380 30 732 19,33819,842
Now we illustrate that the above Nash equilibrium is also an attractive solution
of the game. On the basis of the production foreseen for the actual season, the j th
member, considering the possible external market price and that of the cooperative,
as well as his behaviour strategy (faithfulness or unfaithfulness) declares to deliver
amount kjqj to the cooperative. Let (1, 0.9, 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.94) be the vector of foreseen
deliveries kj. The total amount that should be delivered to the cooperative is Q= 600.4.
This means that only the ﬁrst and third members think to be faithful, the rest of them
would retain a part of their production for sale in the external market. At the time of the
actualharvest, thevectorofeffectivedeliverieshj turnsouttobe(0.8, 0.85, 1, 0.8, 0.75,
0.82), and the actual total delivery to the cooperative is å
n
j=1hjqj= 549.82, compared
to 666 foreseen at the beginning of the season, see Table 3. For the cooperative, the
amount of product missing with respect to the members’ declaration is 116.18; 50.62
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of which, at the time of delivery ended up on the direct market.
Table 3. If ﬁve out of six members deviate from their equilibrium strategies, while the cooper-
ative maintains its strategy pair p
0 = 0:1 and p
1 = 6:1, the income of each unfaithful
member decreases with respect to its equilibrium value, resulting in a total 16,273.03
for members, while the income of the cooperative is 19,380.05.
Member qj kj kjqj hj hjqj (1 hj)qj (kj  hj)qj
1 60 1 60 0.9 54 6 6
2 90 0.9 81 0.85 76.5 13.5 4.5
3 60 1 60 1 60 0 0
4 100 0.9 90 0.8 80 20 10
5 180 0.8 144 0.75 135 45 9
6 176 0.94 165.44 0.82 144.32 31.68 21.12
Totals 666 600.44 549.82 116.18 50.62
Member Direct Coop NonDel Extra Fj Fn+1
1 216 1,620 18 219.6 1,598.4 1,677.6
2 486 2,295 13.5 494.1 2,273.4 2,667.6
3 0 1,800 0 0 1,800 1,800
4 720 2,400 30 732 2,358 2,862
5 1,620 4,050 27 1,647 3,996 5,454
6 1,140.5 4,329.6 63.36 1,159.488 4,247.232 4,918.848
Totals 4,182.5 16,494.6 151.86 4,252.188 16,273.03 19,380.05
Let us suppose now the cooperative, leaving invariant p
0 = 0:1, changes penalty
rate p
1 from 6.1 to non-equilibrium value p1 = 0:6, which does not satisfy condition
(10) of Theorem 1, from Table 4 we can see that some of the members (namely mem-
bers 2, 4, 5 and 6) beneﬁt from their unfaithfulness.
5. Discussion
Our theorems show that an appropriate penalty set by the cooperative can force the
members to sell the contracted quantities to the cooperative. This is true even in the
case if, at the moment of the corresponding strategy choice, the players have only
probabilistic information on the possible market price. From the estimations made in
the proofs of both theorems we can see, if inequalities (8) and (9) are strict, then the
respective Nash equalities in Theorem 1 and 2 for all members are strict, which means
a strong motivation for the members to stick to their equilibrium strategies.
From the particular structure of the payoff functions it is clear that the obtained
Nash equilibria are also attractive solutions, with the cooperative as distinguished
player. In Larbani (1997), apart from the introduction of the concept of an attrac-
tive solution, a general existence theorem was proved. In the present paper, instead of
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Table 4. If the cooperative deviates from its equilibrium strategy pair (p
0;p
1) = (0:1;6:1), set-
ting (p
0;p1) = (0:1;0:6), some of the members are better off by their unfaithfulness.
The total income of all members amounts to 20,106.97.
Member qj kj kjqj hj hjqj (1 hj)qj (kj  hj)qj
1 60 1 60 0.9 54 6 6
2 90 0.9 81 0.85 76.5 13.5 4.5
3 60 1 60 1 60 0 0
4 100 0.9 90 0.8 80 20 10
5 180 0.8 144 0.75 135 45 9
6 176 0.9 165.44 0.82 144.32 31.68 21.12
Totals 666 600.44 549.8 116.2 50.62
Member Direct Coop NonDel Extra Fj Fn+1
1 216 1,620 18 21.6 1,796.4 1,479.6
2 486 2,295 13.5 48.6 2,718.9 2,222.1
3 0 1,800 0 0 1,800 1,800
4 720 2,400 30 72 3,018 2,202
5 1,620 4,050 27 162 5,481 3,969
6 1,140.48 4,329.6 63.36 114.048 5,292.672 3,873.408
Totals 4,182.48 16,495 151.86 418.248 20,106.97 15,546.11
the application of this existence theorem, we have explicitly given this solution. Al-
though among the other reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium (cf. Van Damm 1995) there
isn’t any with a distinguished player as the cooperative in our case, it is an open ques-
tion whether some dynamic approach to the strategic choice of players (see e.g. the
evolutionary-dynamic approach of Garay 2002) may lead to a dynamically stable equi-
librium. (ESS) which is also a particular Nash equilibrium, We note that in Varga et al.
(2010), under symmetry conditions, for the “one-shot” version of the game a dynami-
cally stable strict Nash equilibrium was obtained.
While in earlier publications Larbani and Scarelli (2004), Varga et al. (2010), the
considered game was based on a single decision of each player, in the present paper the
effect of a two-step decision of the players is modelled in terms of a normal form game.
The obtained results open the way to modelling of more complex conﬂicts, including
decision mechanisms within the cooperative.
In a more general setting, instead of members of a cooperative the ﬁrst n players
could be independent producers, and player (n+1) a wholesale market operator rather
than a cooperative set up by producers. Then, however, producers probably wouldn’t
accept a threat of a punishment proportional to their “extra proﬁt”, which in the case
of a cooperative may be acceptable since the members are interested in maintaining
the cooperative in the long-term. In our setup, it this “overpunishment” that forces the
producers to accept the Nash equilibrium.
Finally, our model can also be extended to the case of an oligopolistic market,
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where the market price decreases with the increase of the product supply. In the paper
Varga et al. (2010), for a one-shot version of the game between a cooperative and its
members this extension has been done for a Cournot type oligopoly market with linear
inverse demand function, in the present case it may be a lot more complicated.
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